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Abstract
The following article attempts to clarify the ambivalent relationship that Max Horkheimer 
and Herbert Marcuse developed with the vitalist and phenomenological tendencies that 
permeated philosophy and the social sciences during the Weimar Republic. More precise-
ly, it traces how both thinkers, in spite of acknowledging the “truth moment” contained 
in the criticism that the philosophical exponents of both movements (Husserl, Bergson, 
Dilthey) developed of 19th century positivism, also recognized in its shallow populari-
zation the advancement of a dangerous philosophical irrationalism, suspicious of science 
and Enlightenment values, that would soon become an accomplice to the rise of fascism.
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Resum. Les vicissituds de la política de la «vida»: la recepció de Max Horkheimer i Herbert 
Marcuse de la fenomenologia i el vitalisme en l’Alemanya de Weimar
L’article següent s’ocupa d’aclarir la relació ambivalent que Max Horkheimer i Herbert 
Marcuse van desenvolupar amb les tendències vitalista i fenomenològica que van permear la 
filosofia i les ciències socials durant la república de Weimar. Més precisament, documenta 
com ambdós pensadors, alhora que van reconèixer el «moment de veritat» latent en la 
crítica al positivisme del segle xix, expressat pels referents genuïnament filosòfics dels dos 
moviments (Husserl, Bersong, Dilthey), van detectar el desenvolupament popularitzant 
d’un perillós irracionalisme filosòfic, suspicaç davant la ciència i els valors il·lustrats, que 
aviat va esdevenir còmplice de l’auge del totalitarisme.
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1. Introduction
In the 1920s and early 1930s both Max Horkheimer and Herbert Marcuse 
engaged critically with phenomenology and vitalism. But their reception of 
these two broad and heterogeneous philosophies differed in important 
respects. Examining these differences will help us understand not only Hork-
heimer and Marcuse’s intellectual development and the origins of the Critical 
Theory of the Frankfurt School; it will also illuminate the important role that 
phenomenology and vitalism played in setting the terms of intellectual and 
cultural debate in Weimar Germany. Phenomenology and vitalism contrib-
uted significantly to a widespread revolt against science, positivism and ration-
ality more generally, which began at the end of the 19th century and reached 
its peak in Weimar Germany. In what follows I will reconstruct Horkheimer 
and Marcuse’s reception of phenomenology and vitalism in order to illustrate 
how the two of them interpreted and participated in this broad critique of 
rationality. I would like to demonstrate, in particular, that Horkheimer 
became aware before Marcuse of the limitations and dangers of the increas-
ingly popular and popularized versions of phenomenology and vitalism in 
Weimar. Despite his deep appreciation of phenomenology and vitalism, 
Horkheimer had already begun in the late 1920s to argue that these philo-
sophical critiques of positivism were devolving into a rejection of reason as 
such, which played directly into the hands of increasingly powerful conserv-
ative political currents in Weimar. Marcuse, for his part, remained more 
enthusiastic about the phenomenological and vitalist critique of rationality 
until 1933. Between 1928 and 1933 Marcuse was a student of Martin Hei-
degger’s at the University of Freiburg. During this time Marcuse developed 
an idiosyncratic version of Hegelian-Marxism, which incorporated key ele-
ments of Heidegger’s phenomenology. It was only after Heidegger’s surprising 
embrace of National Socialism in 1933 that Marcuse reassessed his relation-
ship to phenomenology and vitalism.
2. Horkheimer on vitalism and phenomenology
In my reconstruction of Horkheimer’s reception of phenomenology and vital-
ism I will draw primarily on a series of lectures he gave in the late 1920s 
(Horkheimer, 1990). The title of these lectures, “The Emancipation of Phi-
losophy from Science,” suggests the overall trajectory of Horkheimer’s intel-
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lectual historical narrative. The historical point of departure for Horkheimer’s 
lectures was the 1850s.1 This was a time when, as Marx put it, the decompo-
sition of the Hegelian absolute spirit was largely complete – the widespread 
influence of Hegel’s philosophy in Europe had given way to a new realism and 
a general disdain for “German metaphysics”. The rapid advance of the natural 
and physical sciences in 19th century Europe seemed to confirm August 
Comte’s prediction that the theological and metaphysical stages of human 
evolution would soon give way to a new “positive” epoch in which science 
would not only guarantee unlimited progress but would also become the sole 
arbiter of truth. Horkheimer demonstrates that philosophy was able to salvage 
a small and a rather insignificant place for itself within the changed intellec-
tual division of labor of the 1850s, 1860s and 1870s only by subordinating 
itself to science and dedicating itself to working out the epistemological foun-
dations of scientific method. Horkheimer explains the rise of neo-Kantianism 
in German academic philosophy in the second half of the 19th century pre-
cisely in these terms. The pioneers and leading figures of neo-Kantianism, such 
as Hermann Cohen, returned to Kant in order to secure the epistemological 
foundations of the natural sciences, not to revitalize Kant’s concerns with 
ethics, aesthetics or metaphysics. 
Horkheimer viewed the neo-Kantians as taking the first tentative step 
toward reestablishing the legitimacy of philosophy in a positivist epoch. But 
the first truly substantial attempt to break the monopoly of positivism and to 
reestablish philosophy as an autonomous discipline came with the publication 
of Edmund Husserl’s Logical Investigations in the year 1900 (Cf. Horkheimer, 
1990: 299-316). In that work Husserl argued that all forms of positivism, 
including psychology and other natural and social sciences, were relativistic 
insofar as their findings were always ultimately based on empirical evidence. 
Philosophy, on the other hand, could make justified claims to absolute truth 
insofar as it is based on the immutable foundation of pure logic. But Hork-
heimer believed that Husserl’s attempt to reestablish the logical foundations 
of philosophy was beset with many problems. Whereas the positivists had 
relied too exclusively on sense impressions, Husserl was too quick to sever 
philosophy from empirical considerations. Horkheimer’s critique of Husserl 
marks an important turning point in his narrative of the history of recent 
philosophy. Whereas academic philosophy had been thoroughly subordinated 
to science in the late 19th century, Husserl’s Logical Investigations marks the 
beginning of a movement in the opposite direction; a movement to separate 
philosophy from science and, ultimately, to subordinate science to philosophy. 
In Husserl’s case, however, Horkheimer stresses his intellectual probity and his 
insistence upon conceptual rigor. Although Husserl had mounted an impor-
tant critique of positivism and the limitations of scientific rationality, he had 
by no means abandoned conceptual knowledge as such; on the contrary, he 
1. For a more detailed examination and analysis of these lectures, see Abromeit (2011: 124-
140). 
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believed that his Logical Investigations attained a more rigorous form of phil-
osophical knowledge, based on the immutable foundations of pure logic.
Horkheimer portrays vitalism, or Lebensphilosophie, as it was called in Ger-
many, as the next historical step in the emancipation of philosophy from 
science. Definitions of philosophical vitalism differ, but Friedrich Nietzsche, 
Wilhelm Dilthey and Henri Bergson are usually considered its main repre-
sentatives. Although Horkheimer does address both Nietzsche and Dilthey 
elsewhere in his work, in these lectures he focuses primarily on Bergson, 
because he best exemplified the shifting relationship between science and phi-
losophy that interested Horkheimer (Cf. Horkheimer, 1990: 269-287, 399-
419). As we have seen, Husserl subordinated science to philosophy, but he still 
considered philosophy to be a logically rigorous and strictly theoretical under-
taking. Bergson, in contrast, rejected conceptual knowledge as inadequate for 
the purpose of understanding reality. For Bergson, all forms of conceptual 
knowledge, including science, do not reveal to us the way things are “in them-
selves” but are instead useful devices for manipulating reality, particularly 
“lesser” forms of reality, such as nature or inert matter. Bergson argues that 
reality in its highest and most authentic form is the unceasingly active, inex-
haustible creative will of life, and the further one distances oneself from this 
élan vital, the less authentic one’s findings become as a form of knowledge. If 
one hopes to access life directly, one must rely on intuition not rational con-
cepts. Horkheimer summarizes the significance of Bergson’s position within 
the larger trajectory of recent philosophy in the following way: 
Scientific knowledge, understood in the traditional theoretical sense, was given 
a philosophical foundation by neo-Kantianism, demoted to the position of a 
subordinate and particular type of knowledge by phenomenology, and com-
pletely rejected as a means of finding truth in the vitalistic philosophy of 
Bergson. (Horkheimer, 1990: 400-401)
Despite his grave criticisms of the irrationalist tendencies in Bergson’s philos-
ophy, Horkheimer also praises him for making important contributions in 
certain areas. For example, he viewed Bergson’s rejection of the application of 
the mechanical methods of the natural sciences to the human psyche as an 
important step beyond the scientific psychology of the 19th century. Bergson’s 
critique of science also pointed to the necessity of not separating conceptual 
knowledge from the social and historical contexts in which it is produced. 
Among his contemporaries in Weimar Germany, Horkheimer considered 
Max Scheler to be the philosopher who developed the impulses of phenom-
enology and vitalism in the most fruitful and rigorous manner (Cf. Hork-
heimer, 1990: 323-333, 392-399). Horkheimer points, for example, to Schel-
er’s appropriation of Husserl’s concept of the intuition of essences 
[Wesensschau]. Whereas for Husserl, Wesenschau could provide access to 
essences only insofar as they existed logically, Scheler claimed it could unlock 
the metaphysical essences of objects and provide the key to their being as such. 
Scheler believed, at this time, that Wesenschau might even help liberate 
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Europe from the iron cage of rationalization into which it had haplessly 
maneuvered itself. In 1919, Scheler – quotes Horkheimer – described the 
reenchantment of the world, which could be brought about by phenomenol-
ogy, in the following glowing terms:
It will be like the first step into a garden in full bloom of someone who has 
been living in a dark prison for many years. And this prison will be our milieu, 
which has been restricted by an understanding directed merely toward the 
mechanical and mechanizable [Mechanisierbare], with its “civilization.” And 
this garden will be the colorful world of God, which we will see – if only in 
the distance – opening itself up and greeting us warmly. And this prisoner will 
be the European man of today and yesterday, who enters sighing and groaning 
under the burden of his own mechanisms and who, with nothing but the earth 
in view and with heaviness in his limbs, has forgotten his God and his world. 
(Horkheimer, 1990: 324)
Scheler’s evocative and provocative statements here clearly demonstrate how 
the abstract and philosophically rigorous doctrines of phenomenology, as for-
mulated in Husserl’s pre-war writings, were being placed in the service of 
a much broader critique of civilization in the Weimar period. 
But, as was the case with Husserl and Bergson, Horkheimer still took 
Scheler seriously as a philosopher. He recognized the important moment of 
truth in Scheler’s argument, while at the same time taking issue with his 
one-sided critique of science and rationality. Horkheimer was ultimately more 
concerned about the popularizations of phenomenology and vitalism than 
with the philosophical doctrines themselves. One important example that 
Horkheimer gives of such a popularization was Oswald Spengler’s Decline of 
the West, which enjoyed wide popularity in Germany in the 1920s, especially 
among culturally conservative circles. Horkheimer dismisses Spengler’s study 
as an eclectic and superficial synthesis of poorly understood material from a 
wide variety of fields. He is particularly vehement in his rejection of Spengler’s 
facile comparison of the development of human culture with the life cycle of 
plants. For Horkheimer, there is no comparison between genuine Lebensphi-
losophie and popularizers like Spengler. He states,
Whereas Bergson [was] very much aware of the internal difficulties associated 
with Lebensphilosophie in all its forms, insofar as it calls the absolute validity of 
thought and science into question, without, however, diminishing the emphat-
ic claim to truth for its own arguments […] Spengler blithely and pathetically 
presents his sweeping views about the relativity and transience of all types 
of science, indeed, of culture in general, while at the same time drawing on 
every page upon claims that he has appropriated […] from this same science. 
(Horkheimer, 1990: 295-296)
Horkheimer sees this increasingly popular and superficial rejection of science, 
as represented in Spengler’s work, as part of a larger tendency, which was 
anticipated and influenced by phenomenology and vitalism. Horkheimer 
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argued that the attempt to rehabilitate metaphysics, which spread quickly from 
Scheler and other students of Husserl to the influential phenomenological 
movement as a whole, and the rejection of conceptual knowledge in favor of 
intuition, which characterized the popularized versions of both phenomenol-
ogy and Lebensphilosophie, were part of a much larger cultural current in 
Europe during the first decades of 20th century. Horkheimer characterizes this 
current in the following way:
At this point phenomenology merges with the widespread contemporary trend 
toward a new romanticism which has as its motto, to genuine reality, to the 
concrete and primordial, away from decadent, Western European, intellectu-
alized man, and which is fascinated with primitive cultures, foreign cultures 
in general, classical antiquity and the Middle Ages. (Horkheimer, 1990: 331)
Not surprisingly, another defining characteristic of this intellectual and cul-
tural movement was its rejection of the Enlightenment.2 In fact, many of its 
adherents viewed the Enlightenment, which had mounted the first concerted 
attack on metaphysics and rejected appeals to legitimacy based on authority 
or intuition, as the source of their problem. Horkheimer was deeply con-
cerned about this widespread sentiment and he took it very seriously. In 
lectures he had given in previous semesters on the history of modern philos-
ophy, Horkheimer devoted an inordinate amount of time to the Enlighten-
ment (Cf. Horkheimer, 1987a: 294-401). He stressed, in particular, the need 
to recover the materialist and radical political impulses of the French Enlight-
enment. This was truly an exceptional argument at this time, for the invidi-
ous comparison of French “civilization” to German Kultur, popularized by 
Spengler, still played an important role among Weimar intellectuals, especial-
ly those on the political right. But the critique of “shallow French civilization” 
was part of a popularized, nationalist version of a much deeper critique of 
rationality, which was by no means limited to conservative thinkers. The 
radical critique of scientific rationality initiated by Husserl and the vitalists 
also had a substantial influence on left-wing intellectuals in Weimar Germa-
ny (Cf. Raulet, 1994).
As noted, Horkheimer too recognized an important moment of truth in 
these criticisms. His interpretation of the history of contemporary philosophy 
was structured largely as a dialectic of Enlightenment which played itself out 
in the 19th and early 20th century. The dialectic began with the collapse of 
the original, politically and ethically driven Enlightenment project into a mon-
olithic scientific worldview whose limitations soon became apparent. The 
crisis of liberalism in the late 19th and early 20th century was at the same time 
a crisis of an increasingly narrow concept of scientific rationality, which no 
longer seemed like it could realize the Enlightenment promises of a society 
2. Horkheimer notes, for example, “in the last decades in Germany one has become accus-
tomed to seeing the two words, Enlightenment and superficiality, as belonging together, 
even as meaning the same thing” (Horkheimer, 1987b: 205). 
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that would guarantee more justice and happiness for all. Put another way, one 
of the paradoxical consequences of the Enlightenment quest to perceive real-
ity free from the distortions of metaphysics and myth, and to bring nature 
under man’s control, was to undermine the very political and ethical ideals in 
the name of which this scientific process had been initiated in the first place. 
In his lectures, Horkheimer describes this process in the following way:
If no other realities existed beyond the world of physics and psychology, then 
the ideals which had guided the early development of this society and which 
justified the efforts of its individual members –be it human dignity, morality, 
freedom or something similar– were at best imagined or even fictitious […] At 
no other time did the consciousness of the meaninglessness of the natural reality 
threaten to become so strong as in the present, in which this natural reality alone 
is considered valid. (Horkheimer, 1990: 319-320)
The next step in this dialectic of Enlightenment, according to Horkheimer, was 
a pronounced reaction against the rational disenchantment of the world. The 
emergence and popularization of phenomenology and vitalism represented a 
sweeping return of all that positivism had repressed. The increasingly irration-
al forms in which this reaction manifested itself deeply troubled Horkheimer 
as did its tendency to reject the legacy of the Enlightenment tout court. For 
Horkheimer was convinced that the only way beyond the contemporary crisis 
was a discriminating reappropriation of the Enlightenment legacy. For example, 
Horkheimer too was convinced that the traditional model of science was in 
crisis, but he was not prepared to abandon science altogether. As he put it:
In response to the question of where, in my opinion, those elements are to 
be found that point beyond the present situation, I would say first, wherever 
intellectual inquiry is pursued in an upright and rigorous manner. […] In 
contrast to most all of the previously mentioned philosophers, I still believe 
that scientific understanding and its labors will contribute more to moving 
beyond the current intellectual situation than those schools of thought that 
believe we should do without it. (Horkheimer, 1990: 332-333)
It was largely in response to this crisis that Horkheimer developed his critical 
theory of society in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Horkheimer’s critical the-
ory was put into practice and developed further when he became director of 
the Institute for Social Research in 1931. As I have argued elsewhere (Abro-
meit, 2011), his intellectual trajectory in Weimar differed in important 
respects from most of the leading figures associated with the Institute for Social 
Research and/or Western Marxism, such as Marcuse, Adorno, Benjamin, 
Bloch and Lukács. Horkheimer was less influenced by the sweeping rejection 
of positivism, or at least became aware of its shortcomings before the others 
did, and as a result was more open to the continuing critical potential not only 
of the Enlightenment, but also the social sciences. Without this openness, the 
crucial integration of empirical social research and psychoanalysis into this 
Critical Theory in the early 1930s would never have occurred. 
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3. Marcuse’s path towards and away from vitalism and phenomenology 
Whereas the general outlines of Horkheimer’s reception of vitalism and phe-
nomenology emerge clearly from lectures he gave in late 1920s, in order to do 
justice to Marcuse’s reception it is necessary to focus on two different phases 
in his intellectual development. The first phase, in the early 1920s, was defined 
by a lengthy dissertation he wrote at the University of Freiburg in 1922 on the 
subject of the German artist-novel, or Künstlerroman (Marcuse, 1978: 7-343). 
Marcuse’s interpretation of the Künstlerroman was heavily influenced by the 
vitalist historicism of Wilhelm Dilthey and the romantic anti-capitalism of 
the early Georg Lukács. During the second phase, which lasted from 1928-
1933, Marcuse was also in Freiburg, but this time in order to study philosophy 
with Martin Heidegger. During this time Marcuse wrote a series of substantial 
essays and a second dissertation on Hegel, in which he developed an idiosyn-
cratic version of Hegelian Marxism, which demonstrated not only the contin-
uing influence of Dilthey’s vitalism, but also, and more importantly, an effort 
to appropriate certain aspects of Heidegger’s phenomenology. In contrast to 
Horkheimer, who had already clearly recognized in the 1920s that the phe-
nomenological and vitalist critique of science and rationalism could also be 
appropriated for right-wing political projects, Marcuse did not articulate a 
serious critique of these tendencies until after 1933, when he joined Hork-
heimer at the Institute for Social Research. It was not just Heidegger’s enthu-
siastic embrace of National Socialism in 1933 that made Marcuse aware of the 
dangers of his appropriation of vitalism and phenomenology. Marcuse had 
also written an article in 1931 praising Hans Freyer’s attempt to provide a 
phenomenological foundation for sociology (Marcuse, 1978: 488-508). Like 
Heidegger, Freyer would soon become an outspoken defender of the Nation-
al Socialist “revolution from the right.” In his 1934 essay, “The Struggle 
Against Liberalism in the Totalitarian View of the State” (Marcuse, 1968: 
3-42), Marcuse articulated a powerful critique of the vitalist and phenomeno-
logical currents which had prepared the way intellectually for the Nazi seizure 
of power. Central to Marcuse’s critique and self-critique was a reevaluation of 
philosophical rationalism, which remained a strong tendency in his thought 
throughout the 1930s and which culminated in his 1940 study of Hegel, 
Reason and Revolution. 
The importance for Marcuse of the vitalist revolt against positivism and 
rationalism was clearly apparent in his 1922 dissertation, The German Art-
ist-Novel. Methodologically, Marcuse’s study was part of the revival of human 
sciences or Geisteswissenschaften in Germany, which had been decisively influ-
enced by Wilhelm Dilthey. Although Horkheimer did not include Dilthey in 
his lectures on the “emancipation of philosophy from science,” he very easily 
could have. Dilthey’s efforts to articulate the methodological foundations of 
the Geisteswissenschaften and to separate them clearly from the Naturwissen-
schaften, represented a crucial step in overcoming the dominance of positivism 
in Germany in the late 19th and early 20th century. Dilthey’s 1905 study, Das 
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Erlebnis und die Dichtung, in particular, had a huge impact on the study of 
literature in Germany. Dilthey placed the concept of experience and the intu-
itive interpretation of the subjective expression of meaning in different histor-
ical epochs at the center of the human sciences. He demonstrated that the 
natural sciences were incapable of answering the most important questions 
about human existence. These questions were historical and cultural and could 
only be answered by studying the meanings embedded in the cultural produc-
tion of past epochs. Following Vico’s verum-factum principle, Dilthey argued 
that we could understand history much better than we could nature, since we 
had created history ourselves and we were essentially historical beings.
In his interpretation of the German artist-novel, Marcuse followed 
Dilthey’s approach in important respects. By immersing himself in this 
sub-genre of the Bildungsroman, in which artists were the main protagonists, 
Marcuse believed he could uncover the essence of the society and the histori-
cal epoch in which they were written. But Marcuse departed from Dilthey in 
one crucial respect. Whereas Dilthey had followed his mentors in the German 
historical school, such as Leopold von Ranke, who believed that all epochs 
“were equally close to God,” Marcuse argued that modern, bourgeois society 
was characterized precisely by a widespread loss of meaning and community, 
which made it qualitatively different from classical antiquity and the Middle 
Ages. Marcuse’s argument here was clearly indebted to Georg Lukács’ Theory 
of the Novel, which was published in 1916 and was also heavily influenced by 
Dilthey. In The Theory of the Novel, Lukács too argued that the essential char-
acteristic of modern bourgeois society was that meaning no longer inhered in 
the totality of life. Lukács’ argument rested upon a comparison of the domi-
nant aesthetic forms in ancient Greece and modern Europe. Whereas the 
Homeric epic expressed the integrated civilization of ancient Greece, in which 
art and life were still one and meaning inhered in society, the form of the novel 
expressed the diremption of art and life and the loss of meaning in modern 
bourgeois civilization. In modernity, according to Lukács,
[…] the old parallelism of the transcendental structure of the form-giving 
subject and the world of created forms has been destroyed and the ultimate 
basis of artistic creation has become homeless. German romanticism posited 
a close connection between the concept of the novel and the concept of the 
Romantic, and rightly so because the novel form is, like no other, an expres-
sion of this transcendental homelessness. (Lukács, 1979: 40-41)
Marcuse’s study of the German artist-novel could be seen as an extended 
rumination on Lukács’ poignant lament on the separation of art and life and 
the loss of meaning and community in modern bourgeois society. 
In his study Marcuse distinguishes between two types of artist-novels: a 
subjective romantic version, which expresses the genre in its purest form, and 
an objective-realist version, which tends more toward a traditional Bildungs-
roman. Examples of the latter included Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister and the 
second edition of Gottfried Keller’s Der Grüne Heinrich. In both of these 
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novels the protagonist overcomes his alienation and his inability to reconcile 
his consuming interest in art and the demands of everyday life. But, Marcuse 
argues, this integration into bourgeois society comes at a high price. The pro-
tagonist must reduce art either to an occasional educational experience, or to 
a profession which no longer reflects the fundamentally critical and transcend-
ent aesthetic ideals he once held dear. Examples of the subjective-romantic 
artist-novel include Karl-Philip Moritz’s Anton Reiser, Novalis’ Heinrich von 
Ofterdingen or the first edition of Gottfried Keller’s Der Grüne Heinrich. In 
these and the other romantic artist-novels that Marcuse discusses, the protag-
onist sees no possibility of reconciling himself with bourgeois society; he 
remains alienated and usually suffers a tragic fate. In both types of artist-novels, 
however, Marcuse argues that the form of the novel reflects the fact that life has 
become “prosaic” in modern bourgeois society, that the “integrated totalities” 
of classical antiquity, in which art and life were still unified and meaning 
inhered in the social totality, no longer existed. As Marcuse states in the intro-
duction to his study: “The artist-novel only becomes possible when the unity 
of art and life has been sundered, when the artist no longer identifies with 
contemporary forms of life, and his self-consciousness has awoken.” (Marcuse, 
1978: 12; my translation). This yearning for meaning and community, which 
is projected onto classical antiquity or other pre-modern social forms clearly 
mark both Lukács’ and Marcuse’s youthful works as romantic revolts against 
capitalist modernization. Marcuse’s study of the German artist-novel was at the 
same time a vitalist inspired critique of the instrumental rationality of bourgeois 
society. As such it can certainly be seen as part of the broader revolt against 
positivism in Germany at this time, which Horkheimer outlined in his lectures.
Marcuse’s concern with the alienation and reification of “life” in modern 
bourgeois societies would remain an important theme in his writings between 
1928 and 1933 (Cf. Marcuse, 2005; Abromeit, 2004). In 1928 Marcuse 
returned to the University of Freiburg to study with Martin Heidegger. By the 
mid 1920s Marcuse had, like Lukács, moved from a romantic critique of 
bourgeois society to a revolutionary Hegelian-Marxism. Marcuse had partic-
ipated in a revolutionary soldiers’ council in Berlin in 1918-1919 and sympa-
thized with the USPD and early KPD, so his transition to a critical Marxist 
position in the mid 1920s was not surprising. More enigmatic is why a young 
leftist like Marcuse would be attracted to Heidegger, whose attempts to recov-
er the question of the meaning of Being seemed very far removed from the 
pressing concerns of crisis-ridden Weimar Germany. In contrast to many of 
Heidegger’s students at this time, Marcuse’s deeper commitments to Hegelian 
Marxism prevented him from ever becoming a disciple of Heidegger. His 
interest in Heidegger’s philosophy was instrumental from the very beginning. 
Marcuse believed that certain aspects of Heideggerian phenomenology could 
contribute to a revitalization of Marxist theory and practice. Marcuse was 
critical of both the reformism of the German Social Democratic party and the 
“Dialectical Materialism” which had become official doctrine in the Soviet 
Union. Marcuse believed the theoretical shortcomings of both could be traced 
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back to the influence of positivism, which had influenced not only “bourgeois” 
philosophy, but also Marxist theory as well. As Lucien Goldman would put it 
later, in a comparative study of Lukács and Heidegger:
The evolution from Marx to Bernstein, Kautsky and Plekhanov is quite 
homologous to that which caused the German university philosophy of Hegel 
and the Young Hegelians to pass, via Schopenhauer and Haym, to Neo-Kan-
tianism and university positivism. It was in relation to this positivism, both 
university and Marxist, that the beginning of the century was to produce a 
rather profound break. (Goldman, 1977: 3) 
Goldman goes on to argue that Lukács’ critique of reification in History and 
Class Consciousness and Heidegger’s critique of Western rationality in Being 
and Time resemble one another in crucial ways. His demonstration that both 
Lukács and Heidegger were reacting against positivism helps us make sense of 
Marcuse’s interest in Heidegger. There were two aspects of Heidegger’s phe-
nomenology, in particular, which Marcuse believed could contribute to over-
coming the positivist depredations of Marxist theory: first, Heidegger’s critique 
of the rationalist concept of subjectivity and, second, his ontological concept of 
historicity.
One of Heidegger’s main aims in Being and Time was to demonstrate how 
an abstract rationalist notion of time and subjectivity had dominated Western 
philosophy since classical antiquity. According to Heidegger, this tendency 
had already become dominant in the philosophy of Aristotle, as could be seen 
by his definition of time in terms of abstract notions of space (Cf. Heidegger, 
1962: 472-484). The tradition of abstract rationalism was rearticulated and 
reinforced at the beginning of the modern period by Descartes, who reduced 
subjectivity, as ego cogito, to an external and passive observer of mechanical 
natural laws (Heidegger, 1962: 122-134). According to Heidegger, 19th cen-
tury positivism was simply a more advanced version of the dominant ration-
alist tendency in Western philosophy. One of the most important consequenc-
es of the positivist reliance upon natural scientific methodology was its attempt 
to eliminate the role of the subject in the process of knowledge. The natural 
sciences were supposed to produce “objective” truths through rational reflec-
tion and empirical experimentation. Truth obtained in this manner could be 
reproduced by any individual anywhere willing to engage in the same process 
of reflection or to replicate the same experiments. Thus, for positivism, the 
implicit collective subject of scientific knowledge was a passive, knowing sub-
ject who exists outside the world and has no effect upon its operation. It is 
what Heidegger would call a “world-less” subject. It is fundamentally an epis-
temological subject insofar as its primary purpose is to obtain knowledge and 
insofar as it rests upon a fundamental distinction between a knowing subject 
and a known object. To provide an alternative to this “world-less” epistemo-
logical subject Heidegger engaged in an existential analytic of Dasein, which 
he calls “Being-in-the-world.” In other words, Heidegger analyzes the ontolog-
ical foundations of subjectivity and the ways in which subjectivity is always 
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already embedded in particular contexts of meaning and action. Heidegger 
attempted to demonstrate how the concrete particularity and ontological char-
acteristics of human Dasein have been consistently obscured by the rationalist 
conception of subjectivity that has dominated Western philosophy and West-
ern science.
Insofar as Marxist theory had been contaminated by the passive, epistemo-
logical conception of subjectivity implicit in positivism, Marcuse believed it 
could benefit from a critical appropriation of Heideggerian phenomenology. 
Anticipating similar arguments by his future colleague Walter Benjamin, Mar-
cuse rejected the quietist view that Marx had discovered the scientific laws which 
proved the inevitability of socialism. This overemphasis on the “scientific” char-
acter of Marx’s theory, which dominated the Second International, had led to 
the revisionism of the Social Democrats and the vanguardism of the Bolsheviks, 
which both viewed the working class as passive objects. But in his 1928 article, 
“Contributions to a Phenomenology of Historical Materialism,” Marcuse argued 
that “The truths of Marxism are not truths of knowing, but rather truths of 
happening.” (Marcuse, 2005: 1) Marcuse’s appropriation here of the Heideg-
gerian concept of “happening” (Geschehen), demonstrated his conviction that 
contemporary Marxist theory could be revitalized by Heidegger’s attempts to 
reveal the ontological foundations of subjectivity, which had been concealed by 
the rationalist tradition of Western philosophy. Heidegger’s efforts in Being and 
Time to uncover the ontological foundations of Dasein, culminated in his claim 
that Dasein is by its very nature a historical being. With his concept of historic-
ity, Heidegger offered an alternative to the various inauthentic modes of Being-
in-the-World, to which Dasein could fall prey. Living authentically, in accord 
with the ontological historicity of Dasein, was possible only by tearing oneself 
away from the bad immediacy of the present, consciously appropriating the past 
and realizing its highest potential in future-oriented activity. It is not difficult to 
see why this ontological concept of historicity, which posited a fundamentally 
active concept of subjectivity, appealed greatly to Marcuse, who was determined 
to overcome positivist influences on Marxist theory.
While he was studying with Heidegger in Freiburg, Marcuse became 
increasingly interested in the philosophical origins of Marx’s critical theory. 
Like Lukács, Marcuse believed that the serious shortcomings of the dominant 
positivist interpretation of Marx could be countered by reexamining Marx’s 
theoretical debt to Hegel. This was precisely the project that Marcuse attempt-
ed to carry out in the Habilitationsschrift, Hegel’s Ontology and the Theory of 
Historicity, which was published in 1932. As the title of the study suggests, 
Marcuse was still very much interested in Heideggerian phenomenology and 
in the concept of historicity, in particular. In his Habilitationsschrift, Marcuse 
argues that Heidegger’s concept of historicity was based on Wilhelm Dilthey’s 
concept of “life,” which Dilthey, in turn, had taken from Hegel’s early writings 
(Cf. Marcuse, 1987: 2-3). Thus, in order to examine the ontological founda-
tions of historicity, Marcuse undertakes a sweeping reinterpretation of Hegel’s 
work as a whole. The unifying and guiding thread of Marcuse’s interpretation 
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of Hegel was the distinction between epistemological and ontological notions of 
subjectivity, as suggested by Heidegger. Marcuse tries to demonstrate, in par-
ticular, how the concept of “life” in Hegel’s early writings expressed the fun-
damentally critical and active “ontological” tendency in his thought, but that 
this tendency was increasingly marginalized and finally eliminated altogether 
by the “epistemological” tendency in Hegel’s later work, which stressed the 
ultimate primacy of absolute knowledge. 
Although still couched in Heideggerian terminology, Marcuse’s study was 
clearly an attempt to uncover the origins of the Marxian dialectic in Hegel’s 
philosophy. Marcuse’s explorations of the philosophical origins of Marx’s 
theory in Hegel’s thought had begun to push him away from Heidegger. The 
publication of Marx’s Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts in 1932 was 
further evidence for Marcuse that the philosophical resources needed to over-
come the positivist depredations of Marx’s theory could be found in Marx’s 
own early work. By the end of 1932 the need to supplement Marxism with 
Heideggerian phenomenology no longer seemed as urgent to Marcuse (Cf. 
Abromeit, 2004: 131-151). 
Even though Marcuse began to move away from Heidegger in the early 
1930s, he did not fully break with him until 1933, when Heidegger became 
an outspoken supporter of the National Socialists. As we have seen, not only 
Heidegger’s phenomenology, but also Dilthey’s vitalism remained a strong pres-
ence in Marcuse’s thought in the early 1930s. Further evidence of Marcuse’s 
continued fascination with phenomenology and vitalism –but also of the poten-
tial dangers of this fascination – can be found in an article that Marcuse wrote 
in 1931 about the German sociologist Hans Freyer. Although Marcuse’s 
engagement with Freyer was not as profound as his engagement with Heideg-
ger, it is instructive insofar as Freyer’s theoretical position during the Weimar 
period was quite similar to Marcuse’s. The fact that Marcuse praised Freyer as 
late as 1931, shortly before Freyer published an open defense of a “revolution 
from the right” (Freyer, 1931), highlights the precarious position into which 
his reception of phenomenology and vitalism had led him.
Before and during WWI, Freyer had been heavily involved in the German 
youth movement. His first publication, Antäus, was a collection of expres-
sionist prose poems and aphorisms that was written during Freyer’s combat 
duty in the trenches on the Western front. It was warmly received, not just 
among the youth movement, but also by leading intellectuals of the period 
on both the left and the right. In the 1920s, Freyer developed a theoretical 
position that was – like Marcuse’s – heavily influenced by Dilthey and by his 
vitalist interpretation of Hegel, in particular. Also like Marcuse, Freyer was 
very much interested in Marx. In the late 1920s, Freyer defined sociology as 
the self-reflexive “science of the class society of high capitalism.” (Freyer, 1931: 
8) At a time when its leading thinkers were trying to depoliticize sociology in 
order to establish it as a legitimate scientific discipline, Freyer railed against 
value-neutrality and insisted that sociology was political by its very nature. 
Freyer’s arguments carried some weight, particularly after 1925 when he 
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became the first person in Germany appointed to a professorship solely for 
sociology, at the University of Leipzig. Freyer’s work was praised in the 1920s 
by other luminaries in the field, such as Georg Simmel, Karl Mannheim and 
even the young American, Talcott Parsons. Freyer went on to form the “Leip-
zig School” of sociology, whose members included his students Arnold Gehlen 
and Helmut Schelsky. But Freyer was also one of the most prominent Weimar 
intellectuals in the so-called conservative revolutionary camp. Although he 
became disillusioned with the Nazis fairly quickly, between the years 1931-
1935, he actively supported a “revolution from the right” in Germany and he 
believed that the National Socialist “movement” could perhaps bring about 
this transformation (Cf. Muller, 1987: 122-161, 223-266). 
The article Marcuse wrote on Freyer in 1931 was a review essay of a study 
Freyer had published the year before called Soziologie als Wirklichkeitswissen-
schaft (Sociology as a Science of Reality). The title of Freyer’s study highlights 
his critique of overly rationalistic approaches to the study of society, which he 
called Logoswissenschaften. With this term Freyer criticized not only the main-
stream German sociology of a Weber or Tönnies, but also Dilthey. Despite his 
praiseworthy efforts to recover Hegel’s philosophy and to separate the human 
sciences from the natural sciences, Freyer believed that Dilthey’s method 
remained too beholden to the rational core of Hegel’s philosophy, i.e. to Geist 
and its logocentric ideal of absolute knowledge. According to Freyer, it was 
not enough for sociology to be a Logoswissenschaft, it must become a Wirkli-
chkeitswissenschaft, which recognizes and studies the non-rational sources of 
social and cultural institutions and dominant forms of knowledge. Everything 
that Hegel considered “objective spirit” had its origins in the non-rational 
processes of human “life” and voluntary acts of subjective will. By recovering 
the non-rational and subjective foundations of society, sociology as a science 
of reality would also become more conscious of its own role in changing soci-
ety. Freyer argued that all previous attempts to found a science of society, 
including Dilthey, have had a passive epistemological relationship to their 
object. Freyer takes recourse to phenomenology in order to lay the foundations 
for a more active approach which insists that the study of society is also nec-
essarily linked to its transformation. According to Freyer, in other words, 
sociology should not just interpret the world, but should also play an active, 
even revolutionary role in changing it. 
The deceptive proximity of Freyer’s understanding of sociology to Marx’s 
emphasis on the unity of theory and praxis helps explain Marcuse’s interest in 
Freyer. Marcuse praised Freyer’s Soziologie als Wirklichkeitswissenschaft “as the 
most profound attempt at theoretical self-reflection in contemporary sociol-
ogy; indeed, in comparison to the other theoretical and methodological dis-
cussions of sociology that exist, it is the only radical attempt at self-reflection 
that exists at all”, (Marcuse, 1978: 488). Marcuse praises Freyer, in particular, 
for recognizing that the foundations of sociology must be sought in philoso-
phy, and for turning to phenomenology, Dilthey’s vitalist historicism, Hegel 
and Marx in order to recover these foundations. In addition, Marcuse praises 
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Freyer’s critique of mainstream sociology as a Logoswissenschaft as well as his 
recourse to the concepts of life and historicity in order to recover its active, 
political dimension. Indeed, for Marcuse, Freyer does not go far enough in this 
direction. Marcuse argues that Freyer’s attempts to establish sociology as a system 
and his unbroken belief in the existence of a timeless realm of the spirit are 
irreconcilable with his desire to reestablish sociology as a self-reflexive and 
thoroughly historical critique of modern bourgeois society. In order to criticize 
these remnants of traditional scientific methodology and idealism that still 
existed in Freyer’s work, Marcuse takes recourse to a Heideggerian concept of 
historicity. Marcuse argues that the full historicity of sociology can only be 
established by recovering the ontological characteristics of Dasein. But Marcuse 
moves beyond Heidegger to Marx, when he argues that these ontological struc-
tures have been suppressed, not by an obscure process of Seinsvergessenheit, 
which has its roots in the rationalistic biases of ancient Greek philosophy, but 
in the proliferation of the commodity form and the rise of abstract labor in 
modern capitalism. Marcuse would attempt to explain this “theory of historic-
ity” in detail in his Habilitationschrift on Hegel. For now, it must suffice for us 
to note that Marcuse’s interest in Dilthey’s vitalist historicism and Heidegger’s 
phenomenology had brought him very close indeed to Hans Freyer’s project of 
establishing a philosophical foundation for sociology based on the phenome-
nological concept of historicity and the vitalist notion of life. 
During the next two years, Freyer would publish an inflammatory political 
tract called “Revolution from the Right;” Heidegger would embrace Nation-
al Socialism, and Marcuse would be forced to flee Germany. While in exile in 
Geneva and later in New York, Marcuse wrote an essay for the Zeitschrift für 
Sozialforschung, i.e. the house journal of Max Horkheimer’s Institute for Social 
Research, for which Marcuse was now working. In this essay, which was called 
“The Struggle Against Liberalism in the Totalitarian View of the State,” Mar-
cuse articulated for the first time a serious critique of those aspects of vitalism 
and phenomenology which had prepared the way ideologically for the Nazi 
seizure of power. Marcuse’ critique focused, in particular, on two broad ten-
dencies, which he labeled “irrationalistic naturalism” and “political existential-
ism.” Although Marcuse included Lebensphilosophie under the rubric of “irra-
tionalistic naturalism,” he was, like Horkheimer, careful to distinguish the 
proponents of vitalism who had made genuine philosophical contributions 
from those who developed a popularized version which contributed to the 
spread of various irrational ideologies in Weimar Germany. Marcuse placed 
Dilthey and Nietzsche in the former camp, since their work was of the first 
order philosophically and represented a legitimate critique of the limits of the 
late 19th century liberal notion of rationality. In the latter camp Marcuse 
placed a number of conservative, conservative revolutionary and openly Nazi 
philosophers and literary figures, including Oswald Spengler, Müller van den 
Brück, Ernst Jünger, Ludwig Klages, Ernst Krieck and Alfred Bäumler. 
Marcuse identified several broad tendencies that unified these purveyors 
of “irrationalistic naturalism” (Marcuse, 1968: 5-6). First, all of them subor-
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dinated reason to irrational and putatively “natural” givens, which were 
accorded the power of ineluctable and irrefutable norms. In the crudest man-
ifestations of this ideological worldview, irrationalist and allegedly natural 
sources of life, such as “race” and “blood and soil” acquired the status of such 
unquestionable norms. The second primary characteristic of “irrationalist nat-
uralism,” according to Marcuse, is a “depravation of history” and a reduction 
of history to affirmative myth. Marcuse even extends his critique of the den-
igration of history to Heidegger’s concept of historicity, which had been so 
important for his own writings prior to 1933. In a clear reference to Heideg-
ger’s alarming political development, Marcuse writes, 
[…] the strong emphasis on the historicity of existence reveals itself as empty 
[…] Genuine historicity presupposes a cognitive relation of existence to the 
forces of history and, derived from it, the theoretical and practical critique 
of these forces. But in existential anthropology the corresponding relation 
is limited to one of accepting a ‘mandate’ issued to existence by the ‘folk’. 
(Marcuse, 1968: 34-35) 
Marcuse’s reference to “existential anthropology” here points to the second 
main category in his critique of phenomenology and vitalism, namely “polit-
ical existentialism.” With this term Marcuse targets not only Heidegger, but 
also Carl Schmitt. Marcuse refers to “political existentialism” in order to 
distinguish it from “philosophical existentialism.” Even after 1933, Marcuse 
maintained his conviction that Heidegger had made important contributions 
to philosophy, but that the political realization of his ideals also revealed some 
serious shortcomings in his philosophy. The same could be said for Schmitt. 
Marcuse is less willing to separate Schmitt’s theory from his politics, but at 
one point in the essay he does acknowledge the “brilliance” of Schmitt’s 
critique of “liberal rationalism” (Marcuse, 1968: 272). Once again, however, 
the partial realization of Schmitt’s political ideals of the total state left no 
doubt about the fundamental problems in his work. Marcuse identifies sev-
eral characteristics which define the “political existentialism” of Heidegger 
and Schmitt: their voluntarism and decisionism, their theory of the total 
state, and their abstract negation of the rationalism and political ideals of the 
Enlightenment. Marcuse describes the voluntarism and decisionism of polit-
ical existentialism in terms of a “total activation, concretization and politici-
zation of all dimensions of existence. […] The autonomy of thought and the 
objectivity and neutrality of science are repudiated as heresy or even as a 
political falsification on the part of liberalism” (Marcuse, 1968: 33). Marcuse 
goes on to describe the
sorry picture that ‘existential’ anthropology paints of active man. He acts – but 
he knows not what for. He acts – but he has not even decided for himself in 
favor of what he acts. He simply “takes sides” or goes into action. This anthro-
pology derives its pathos from a radical devaluation of Logos as knowledge that 
reveals and decides. (Marcuse, 1968: 33)
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Marcuse then demonstrates how the voluntarism and decisionism of political 
existentialism leads to a theory of the total state. He writes,
The existential as such is exempt from any rational standard or norm lying 
beyond it; it is itself the absolute norm and is inaccessible to any and all ration-
al criticism and justification. Accordingly, political conditions and relation-
ships are now posited as the most emphatically significant factors ‘deciding’ 
existence. And within the political sphere all relationships are oriented in turn 
toward the most extreme ‘crisis’ […] The true possessor of political power is 
defined as beyond all legality and legitimacy: “Sovereign is he who decides on 
the state of emergency.” (Marcuse, 1968: 35-36). 
Marcuse goes on to show how the non-conformist, “authentic” individual, 
with which philosophical existentialism had begun, is reduced to blind obe-
dience to the “community of destiny” and the total state. Summing up Hei-
degger’s development on this particular issue, Marcuse writes,
In philosophy, existentialism begins as the antagonist in a great debate with 
Western rationalism and idealism, intending to save their conceptual content 
by injecting it into the historical concretion of individual existence. It ends by 
radically denying its own origin; the struggle against reason drives it blindly 
into the arms of the powers that be. (Marcuse, 1968: 40)
In short, what began as a justified critique of the limits of liberal rationality, 
its inability fully to realize the political ideals of the Enlightenment, ended as 
an abstract negation of those ideals themselves. Rather than attempting to 
preserve and build upon those ideals to develop a rational critique of liberal-
ism, as Hegel and Marx had both done, political existentialism falls behind 
the critical ideals of the Enlightenment into an irrational affirmation of the 
status quo. 
Thus, in the end, Marcuse developed a critique of phenomenology and 
vitalism which was quite similar to that of Horkheimer. Like Horkheimer, 
Marcuse recognized the truth content of its original critique of positivism 
and liberal rationalism at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th 
century. But the popularization and politicization of phenomenology and 
vitalism, which reached its peak in the Weimar period, eventually trans-
formed this critical truth into an apologetic and irrational defense of an 
authoritarian regime. Against these developments, both Horkheimer and 
Marcuse attempted to recover the critical content of Enlightenment ration-
alism and materialism. This reevaluation of rationalism and materialism con-
tinued to play a strong role in Marcuse’s thought through the 1940s. It cul-
minated in his pathbreaking study of Hegel’s critical and dialectical 
rationalism, Reason and Revolution. Whereas Marcuse had placed the concept 
of “life” at the center of Habilitationschrift on Hegel, written in 1932 for 
Heidegger, in Reason and Revolution, Marcuse interpreted Hegel’s philosophy 
as an attempt to preserve and rework the critical rationalism of the Enlight-
enment and the French Revolution. 
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4. Conclusion
In this essay I have attempted to demonstrate – in broad outline – the ways 
in which Horkheimer and Marcuse’s interpretation of phenomenology and 
vitalism in the 1920s and early 1930s diverged. For his part, Horkheimer 
appreciated the moment of truth in the phenomenological and vitalist cri-
tiques of positivism, but he was also wary of the potential of these critiques 
degenerating into an abstract negation of the Enlightenment and rationality, 
as such, which could then easily be placed in the service of conservative revo-
lutionary critiques of the Weimar Republic. As a critical Marxist, Horkheim-
er himself remained fully aware of the ideological dimensions of the liber-
al-democratic political tradition, which had emerged out of the historical 
Enlightenment. But – like Rosa Luxemburg, whom he greatly admired – 
Horkheimer called for a determinate negation of this tradition, which would 
preserve its best aspects, while at the same time overcoming the ways in which 
it concealed and justified capitalist social domination. The conservative revo-
lutionary critique of the Weimar Republic, which was often directly inspired 
or shared strong theoretical affinities with phenomenological and vitalist cri-
tiques of rationalism (albeit often in a popularized form), negated Enlighten-
ment principles abstractly, and thus fell behind them – just as National Socialism 
in Germany negated and fell behind the progressive historical achievements of 
liberal democracy. The Nazis’ elimination of equal citizenship rights for the Jews, 
with the introduction of the Nuremburg Laws in 1935, is just one of many 
examples of the repressive consequences of their abstract negation of liberal 
democracy – and a signal of much worse things to come.
For his part, Marcuse was even more drawn to phenomenology and vital-
ism in the 1920s and early 1930s than Horkheimer. His positive reception of 
Dilthey in his dissertation on the German artist-novel, and his enthusiastic 
– if also critical – reception of Heidegger’s Being and Time, as well as Hans 
Freyer’s radical sociology, all demonstrated Marcuse’s strong commitment to 
the anti-rationalist arguments of phenomenology and vitalism during this 
time. It was only after his philosophical mentor, Martin Heidegger, became 
an open and ardent defender of the Nazi “revolution” in 1933, and Marcuse 
– a Jew and Marxist – had to flee Germany, that Marcuse reassessed the lega-
cy of phenomenology and vitalism in Weimar Germany. He carried out this 
reassessment under the auspices of Max Horkheimer, whose Institute for Social 
Research he joined in 1934. Marcuse’s self-critical reassessment of these lega-
cies are apparent in the series of remarkable essays he published in the Insti-
tute’s journal, the Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung, in the 1930s (Marcuse, 1968). 
In these essays, Marcuse moved closer to the position Horkheimer had already 
developed in the 1920; for example, Marcuse now expressed a greater appre-
ciation for the critical potential of rationalism, as it had developed in the 
modern Western philosophy.
To return – in conclusion – to Horkheimer, we have seen how he began 
vigorously defending the Enlightenment in general, and the critical political 
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thrust of the French Enlightenment in particular, already in the 1920s. But it 
is interesting to note that Horkheimer’s interpretation of the Enlightenment 
began to shift in the mid-1930s. After he had emigrated to the U.S. and began 
to see how dominant the positivist tradition still was in the U.S., Horkheim-
er believed a critique of the limitations of positivism was still important. This 
tendency was reinforced by Horkheimer’s increasing proximity to Adorno, 
who finally joined the Institute as a full time member in 1938. Horkheimer’s 
collaboration with Adorno’s in the next few years would, of course, result in 
the publication of Dialectic of Enlightenment in 1944. The predominantly 
pessimistic view of the Enlightenment and the sciences put forth in that book 
has obscured the much more positive assessment of the Enlightenment and 
the sciences which Horkheimer articulated in his early work, largely in 
response to popularized versions of phenomenology and vitalism. I think it is 
important to recover the defense of the tradition of critical Enlightenment 
rationalism and materialism, which one finds in the early thought of Hork-
heimer – and Marcuse as well – in order to distinguish them more clearly from 
post-structuralist critiques of reason and to counter the claims of Jürgen 
Habermas and others that the early Critical Theorists defended a totalizing 
critique of modernity.
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